A process can be legitimate (e.g., an admin tool) but used maliciously . If you close an alert solely because the binary is signed by Microsoft, you have failed the investigation. Always ask: Is the behavior normal for this user/host? Phase 5: Documentation – The Forgotten Victory The best investigation that isn’t documented never happened. Write your notes as if the next analyst (or a court) will read them.
| Severity | Confidence | Action | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | High | High | Isolate host, block IOCs, initiate IR. | | High | Low | Escalate. Request memory capture or EDR deep scan. | | Low | High | False Positive. Document pattern for tuning. | | Low | Low | Close. No further action. |
The difference between a junior analyst who churns through tickets and a senior investigator who stops threats lies not in the tools, but in . Effective threat investigation is a structured discipline—a blend of hypothesis-driven hunting, artifact correlation, and rigorous documentation.